Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations
Publication
, Conference
Deng, Y; Panigrahi, D
Published in: Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
January 1, 2019
We design multi-unit auctions for budget-constrained bidders in the Bayesian setting. Our auctions are supply-monotone, which allows the auction to be run online without knowing the number of items in advance, and achieve asymptotic revenue optimality. We also give an efficient algorithm for implementing our auction by using a succinct and efficiently implementable characterization of supply-monotonicity in the Bayesian setting.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Publication Date
January 1, 2019
Start / End Page
173 / 192
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Deng, Y., & Panigrahi, D. (2019). Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations. In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (pp. 173–192).
Deng, Y., and D. Panigrahi. “Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations.” In Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 173–92, 2019.
Deng Y, Panigrahi D. Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations. In: Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 2019. p. 173–92.
Deng, Y., and D. Panigrahi. “Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations.” Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2019, pp. 173–92.
Deng Y, Panigrahi D. Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations. Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 2019. p. 173–192.
Published In
Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Publication Date
January 1, 2019
Start / End Page
173 / 192