Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?
Publication
, Journal Article
Qiao, S; Hills, Jr., R
Published in: Columbia Human Rights Law Review
2017
Duke Scholars
Published In
Columbia Human Rights Law Review
Publication Date
2017
Volume
48
Issue
3
Start / End Page
158 / 210
Related Subject Headings
- 1801 Law
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Qiao, S., & Hills, Jr., R. (2017). Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party? Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 48(3), 158–210.
Qiao, S., and R. Hills, Jr. “Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 48, no. 3 (2017): 158–210.
Qiao S, Hills, Jr. R. Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party? Columbia Human Rights Law Review. 2017;48(3):158–210.
Qiao, S., and R. Hills, Jr. “Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?” Columbia Human Rights Law Review, vol. 48, no. 3, 2017, pp. 158–210.
Qiao S, Hills, Jr. R. Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party? Columbia Human Rights Law Review. 2017;48(3):158–210.
Published In
Columbia Human Rights Law Review
Publication Date
2017
Volume
48
Issue
3
Start / End Page
158 / 210
Related Subject Headings
- 1801 Law