TURNOUT AND THE CALCULUS OF VOTING: Recent advances and prospects for integration with theories of campaigns and elections
After a review of the basics of the calculus of voting with respect to turnout, this chapter considers two relatively new theoretical advances: the development of a fully articulated theory of expressive voting; and specification of the utility function. It considers a theoretically coherent account of “abstention due to alienation”, and its relationship to the account of moral convictions. Downs began the systematic inquiry into rational choice and turnout by posing the problem as one in expected utility. A second step is needed because basic decision theory yields an incomplete theory. The calculus of voting has been tested extensively, and three terms - the valuation of the outcomes, the costs of voting, and the benefits associated with voting - have been found to be strongly and consistently related to the choice. Ferejohn and Fiorina apply minimax regret to the turnout decision problem. As Aldrich reviews, there are important game theoretic models of turnout.
