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Comparative opinion loss

Publication ,  Journal Article
Eva, B; Stern, R
Published in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
November 1, 2023

It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences that there exist situations in which rational agents inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion loss is countenanced as rational by a substantially broader class of normative theories than has been previously recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational comparative confidence judgements of the form ‘I am at least as confident in p as I am in q’. We then use the comparative confidence framework to develop a novel understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not saddled with the inevitability of rational opinion loss.

Duke Scholars

Published In

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

DOI

EISSN

1933-1592

ISSN

0031-8205

Publication Date

November 1, 2023

Volume

107

Issue

3

Start / End Page

613 / 637

Related Subject Headings

  • Philosophy
  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 2203 Philosophy
 

Citation

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ICMJE
MLA
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Eva, B., & Stern, R. (2023). Comparative opinion loss. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107(3), 613–637. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921
Eva, B., and R. Stern. “Comparative opinion loss.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107, no. 3 (November 1, 2023): 613–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12921.
Eva B, Stern R. Comparative opinion loss. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2023 Nov 1;107(3):613–37.
Eva, B., and R. Stern. “Comparative opinion loss.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 107, no. 3, Nov. 2023, pp. 613–37. Scopus, doi:10.1111/phpr.12921.
Eva B, Stern R. Comparative opinion loss. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2023 Nov 1;107(3):613–637.
Journal cover image

Published In

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

DOI

EISSN

1933-1592

ISSN

0031-8205

Publication Date

November 1, 2023

Volume

107

Issue

3

Start / End Page

613 / 637

Related Subject Headings

  • Philosophy
  • 5003 Philosophy
  • 2203 Philosophy