Regulatory intermediaries and the challenge of democratic policing

Research summary: This study examines a model for achieving democratic governance over police departments: regulatory intermediaries, where non-state actors are empowered with regulatory authority over public institutions. Drawing on a decade of transcripts from monthly public meetings held by the Chicago Police Board (September 2009–February 2021), this study finds, however, that regulatory intermediaries can regulate the public as much as it does the public institution. We identify three ways that the regulating public becomes the regulatory target: through (1) institutional rules, (2) hierarchized responses, and (3) norms of civility. Policy implications: The very multiplicity and heterogeneity of voices that democratic processes seek to incorporate can undermine the institutional changes envisioned. Our policy discussion highlights: (1) the value of subordinating fair policymaking processes when seeking substantive policy ends, (2) the potential and limits of curbing institutional incentives through institutional design, and (3) the importance of gauging community grievances through multiple channels for public input.

Duke Scholars

Author Tony Cheng Sociology