Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels
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Askarov, A; Zhang, D; Myers, AC
Published in: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
December 16, 2010
We investigate techniques for general black-box mitigation of timing channels. The source of events is wrapped by a timing mitigator that delays output events so that they contain only a bounded amount of information. We introduce a general class of timing mitigators that can achieve any given bound on timing channel leakage, with a tradeoff in system performance. We show these mitigators compose well with other mechanisms for information flow control, and demonstrate they are effective against some known timing attacks. Copyright 2010 ACM.
Duke Scholars
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Published In
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
DOI
ISSN
1543-7221
Publication Date
December 16, 2010
Start / End Page
297 / 307
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Askarov, A., Zhang, D., & Myers, A. C. (2010). Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 297–307). https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866341
Askarov, A., D. Zhang, and A. C. Myers. “Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels.” In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 297–307, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1145/1866307.1866341.
Askarov A, Zhang D, Myers AC. Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2010. p. 297–307.
Askarov, A., et al. “Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels.” Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2010, pp. 297–307. Scopus, doi:10.1145/1866307.1866341.
Askarov A, Zhang D, Myers AC. Predictive black-box mitigation of timing channels. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2010. p. 297–307.
Published In
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
DOI
ISSN
1543-7221
Publication Date
December 16, 2010
Start / End Page
297 / 307