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Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy

Human Nature in the Ethics of Mengzi and Xunzi

Publication ,  Chapter
Wong, DB
January 1, 2025

Mengzi and Xunzi sometimes state their views in ways that make them look diametrically opposed to each other: the former says that human nature is good, while the latter says that human nature is bad. This chapter details how both explain their views in more complex and qualified ways that overlap in what they both acknowledge. Mengzi acknowledges inborn dispositions that can impede moral cultivation; Xunzi acknowledges inborn dispositions that contribute positive motivation for cultivation. Both Confucians have much to contribute to contemporary debates over what it means to say that a disposition is part of human nature. Mengzi points to ways that the inborn can involve a readiness to respond to conditions that spur its further development. Xunzi points to ways that cultural practices and norms can express and spur further development of inborn dispositions or regulate and restrain them. Contemporary scientific studies are marshaled to show that their views are as relevant today as when they were alive.

Duke Scholars

DOI

Publication Date

January 1, 2025

Start / End Page

101 / 144
 

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Wong, D. B. (2025). Human Nature in the Ethics of Mengzi and Xunzi. In Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy (pp. 101–144). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199945498.013.5
Wong, D. B. “Human Nature in the Ethics of Mengzi and Xunzi.” In Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy, 101–44, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199945498.013.5.
Wong DB. Human Nature in the Ethics of Mengzi and Xunzi. In: Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy. 2025. p. 101–44.
Wong, D. B. “Human Nature in the Ethics of Mengzi and Xunzi.” Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy, 2025, pp. 101–44. Scopus, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199945498.013.5.
Wong DB. Human Nature in the Ethics of Mengzi and Xunzi. Oxford Handbook of Chinese Philosophy. 2025. p. 101–144.

DOI

Publication Date

January 1, 2025

Start / End Page

101 / 144