Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders
Publication
, Journal Article
Graham, DA; Marshall, RC; Richard, JF
Published in: Economics Letters
January 1, 1990
If IPV bidders are distributionally heterogeneous then a revenue maximizing English auctioneer will, in general, find it optimal to use a non-constant reserve price that is a function of the observed bid sequence. An example is provided. © 1990.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Economics Letters
DOI
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication Date
January 1, 1990
Volume
32
Issue
1
Start / End Page
13 / 17
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 14 Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Graham, D. A., Marshall, R. C., & Richard, J. F. (1990). Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders. Economics Letters, 32(1), 13–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-Z
Graham, D. A., R. C. Marshall, and J. F. Richard. “Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders.” Economics Letters 32, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 13–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-Z.
Graham DA, Marshall RC, Richard JF. Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders. Economics Letters. 1990 Jan 1;32(1):13–7.
Graham, D. A., et al. “Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders.” Economics Letters, vol. 32, no. 1, Jan. 1990, pp. 13–17. Scopus, doi:10.1016/0165-1765(90)90043-Z.
Graham DA, Marshall RC, Richard JF. Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders. Economics Letters. 1990 Jan 1;32(1):13–17.
Published In
Economics Letters
DOI
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication Date
January 1, 1990
Volume
32
Issue
1
Start / End Page
13 / 17
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 14 Economics