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Attracting skeptical buyers: Negotiating for intellectual property rights

Publication ,  Journal Article
Anton, JJ; Yao, DA
Published in: International Economic Review
February 1, 2008

Expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property (IP). In principle, confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use. In practice, sellers often waive confidentiality rights. We provide an incomplete information explanation for the waiver of confidentiality rights that are valuable in complete information settings. Waiving sacrifices the protective value of confidentiality to gain greater buyer participation. Buyer skepticism, which reduces participation, arises endogenously from three elements: asymmetric information regarding seller IP, rent dissipation from competition for IP, and ex post costs from expropriation lawsuits. © 2008 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Duke Scholars

Published In

International Economic Review

DOI

EISSN

1468-2354

ISSN

0020-6598

Publication Date

February 1, 2008

Volume

49

Issue

1

Start / End Page

319 / 348

Related Subject Headings

  • Economics
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3802 Econometrics
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 14 Economics
 

Citation

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Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (2008). Attracting skeptical buyers: Negotiating for intellectual property rights. International Economic Review, 49(1), 319–348. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00481.x
Anton, J. J., and D. A. Yao. “Attracting skeptical buyers: Negotiating for intellectual property rights.” International Economic Review 49, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 319–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00481.x.
Anton JJ, Yao DA. Attracting skeptical buyers: Negotiating for intellectual property rights. International Economic Review. 2008 Feb 1;49(1):319–48.
Anton, J. J., and D. A. Yao. “Attracting skeptical buyers: Negotiating for intellectual property rights.” International Economic Review, vol. 49, no. 1, Feb. 2008, pp. 319–48. Scopus, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00481.x.
Anton JJ, Yao DA. Attracting skeptical buyers: Negotiating for intellectual property rights. International Economic Review. 2008 Feb 1;49(1):319–348.
Journal cover image

Published In

International Economic Review

DOI

EISSN

1468-2354

ISSN

0020-6598

Publication Date

February 1, 2008

Volume

49

Issue

1

Start / End Page

319 / 348

Related Subject Headings

  • Economics
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3802 Econometrics
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 14 Economics