Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games
Publication
, Journal Article
Letchford, J; Conitzer, V
Published in: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
July 23, 2010
Computing optimal strategies to commit to in general normal-form or Bayesian games is a topic that has recently been gaining attention, in part due to the application of such algorithms in various security and law enforcement scenarios. In this paper, we extend this line of work to the more general case of commitment in extensive-form games. We show that in some cases, the optimal strategy can be computed in polynomial time; in others, computing it is NP-hard. © 2010 ACM.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
DOI
Publication Date
July 23, 2010
Start / End Page
83 / 92
Citation
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Letchford, J., & Conitzer, V. (2010). Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 83–92. https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807354
Letchford, J., and V. Conitzer. “Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games.” Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, July 23, 2010, 83–92. https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807354.
Letchford J, Conitzer V. Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 2010 Jul 23;83–92.
Letchford, J., and V. Conitzer. “Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games.” Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, July 2010, pp. 83–92. Scopus, doi:10.1145/1807342.1807354.
Letchford J, Conitzer V. Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 2010 Jul 23;83–92.
Published In
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
DOI
Publication Date
July 23, 2010
Start / End Page
83 / 92