Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments
Publication
, Journal Article
Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T
Published in: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
May 17, 2004
Various aspects of combinatorial auction were discussed. Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions were also described. In a combinatorial auction, there are multiple items for sale and bidders are allowed to place a bid on a bundle of these items. The VCG mechanism is the canonical payment scheme for motivating the bidders to bid truthfully in combinatorial auctions.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
DOI
Publication Date
May 17, 2004
Volume
5
Start / End Page
266 / 267
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Conitzer, V., & Sandholm, T. (2004). Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 5, 266–267. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988826
Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments.” Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 5 (May 17, 2004): 266–67. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988826.
Conitzer V, Sandholm T. Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 2004 May 17;5:266–7.
Conitzer, V., and T. Sandholm. “Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments.” Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, vol. 5, May 2004, pp. 266–67. Scopus, doi:10.1145/988772.988826.
Conitzer V, Sandholm T. Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 2004 May 17;5:266–267.
Published In
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
DOI
Publication Date
May 17, 2004
Volume
5
Start / End Page
266 / 267