Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma
Publication
, Journal Article
Kraines, D; Kraines, V
Published in: Theory and Decision
January 1, 1989
Our Pavlov learns by conditioned response, through rewards and punishments, to cooperate or defect. We analyze the behavior of an extended play Prisoner's Dilemma with Pavlov against various opponents and compute the time and cost to train Pavlov to cooperate. Among our results is that Pavlov and his clone would learn to cooperate more rapidly than if Pavlov played against the Tit for Tat strategy. This fact has implications for the evolution of cooperation. © 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Theory and Decision
DOI
EISSN
1573-7187
ISSN
0040-5833
Publication Date
January 1, 1989
Volume
26
Issue
1
Start / End Page
47 / 79
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 22 Philosophy and Religious Studies
- 17 Psychology and Cognitive Sciences
- 14 Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Kraines, D., & Kraines, V. (1989). Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma. Theory and Decision, 26(1), 47–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134056
Kraines, D., and V. Kraines. “Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma.” Theory and Decision 26, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 47–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134056.
Kraines D, Kraines V. Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma. Theory and Decision. 1989 Jan 1;26(1):47–79.
Kraines, D., and V. Kraines. “Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma.” Theory and Decision, vol. 26, no. 1, Jan. 1989, pp. 47–79. Scopus, doi:10.1007/BF00134056.
Kraines D, Kraines V. Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma. Theory and Decision. 1989 Jan 1;26(1):47–79.
Published In
Theory and Decision
DOI
EISSN
1573-7187
ISSN
0040-5833
Publication Date
January 1, 1989
Volume
26
Issue
1
Start / End Page
47 / 79
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 22 Philosophy and Religious Studies
- 17 Psychology and Cognitive Sciences
- 14 Economics