Scholarly Edition

This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Bloch, F; Demange, G; Kranton, R

Published Date

  • May 1, 2018

Start / End Page

  • 421 - 448

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1111/iere.12275

Citation Source

  • Scopus