RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
Publication
, Scholarly Edition
Bloch, F; Demange, G; Kranton, R
May 1, 2018
This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.
Duke Scholars
Altmetric Attention Stats
Dimensions Citation Stats
DOI
Publication Date
May 1, 2018
Start / End Page
421 / 448
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3802 Econometrics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 14 Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Bloch, F., Demange, G., & Kranton, R. (2018). RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12275
Bloch, F., G. Demange, and R. Kranton. “RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS,” May 1, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12275.
Bloch F, Demange G, Kranton R. RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS. 2018. p. 421–48.
Bloch, F., et al. RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS. 1 May 2018, pp. 421–48. Scopus, doi:10.1111/iere.12275.
Bloch F, Demange G, Kranton R. RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS. 2018. p. 421–448.
DOI
Publication Date
May 1, 2018
Start / End Page
421 / 448
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3802 Econometrics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 14 Economics