Journal ArticleReview of Economic Studies · October 1, 2022
This article considers the effect of contracting limitations in risk-sharing networks, arising for example from observability, verifiability, complexity, or cultural constraints. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency under the ...
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OtherAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics · November 1, 2021
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We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exag ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Theory · September 1, 2021
While the diffuse prior has been widely used in applied economic theory for its technical convenience and as a way of modeling complete lack of knowledge, it is not formally defined, nor are ex ante payoffs in games under this prior. In this paper, we prov ...
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Journal ArticleThe Review of Economic Studies · July 1, 2021
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This article investigates stable and efficient networks in the context of risk sharing, when it is costly to establish and maintain relationships that facilitate risk sharing. We find a novel trade-off between efficiency and equality: the most stable effic ...
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Journal ArticleAmerican Economic Review · January 1, 2020
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How do geographically concentrated income shocks influence the long-run spatial distribution of poverty within a city? We examine the impact on housing prices of a cholera epidemic in one neighborhood of nineteenth century London. Ten years after the epide ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Public Economics · October 1, 2019
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In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally compare the institution of democratic punishment, where members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, with individual peer-to-peer ...
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Journal ArticleQuantitative Economics · March 1, 2018
We investigate the effect of delay on prices in bargaining situations using a data set containing thousands of captives ransomed from Barbary pirates between 1575 and 1692. Plausibly exogenous variation in the delay in ransoming provides evidence that nego ...
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OtherEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · December 4, 2015
In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer-employee relationship. We study ...
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OtherEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · December 4, 2015
Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives." ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · December 2, 2015
We experimentally study the impact of adding an explicit nil vote option to the ballot in both compulsory and voluntary voting settings. We investigate this issue in an informational voting setting, in which some voters are uninformed and face the swing vo ...
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OtherEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · September 17, 2015
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We investigate competition in a delegation framework, with a coarsely informed principal. Two imperfectly informed and biased experts simultaneously propose action choices. A principal with a diffuse prior, and only being able to ordinally compare the two ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · September 17, 2015
This supplement provides welfare results not contained in the main text and a proof of Lemma A.1. For small bonuses, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if a downward equilibrium exists; if so, it is unique. For large bonuses, we find a unique candidate ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · August 26, 2015
In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to- ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · March 23, 2015
This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper · March 1, 2015
This Supplementary Appendix contains the English translations of the experimental questionnaire, survey questions, and instructions that were used in our experimental sessions on June 9th and 10th of 2010. For the original Icelandic language documents, ple ...
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Journal ArticleAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics · January 1, 2015
We propose a finite-horizon continuous-time framework for coalitional bargaining, in which players can make offers at random discrete times. In our model: (i) expected payoffs in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and ...
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Journal ArticleGames and Economic Behavior · November 1, 2014
We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations ge ...
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Journal ArticleAmerican Economic Review · January 2014
We develop a model in which connections between individuals serve
as social collateral to enforce informal insurance payments. We show
that: (i) The degree of insurance is governed by the expansiveness of
the network, measured with the per capita number o ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization · October 1, 2013
This paper considers a model of legislative decision-making, in which information must be collected from a strategic lobbyist. The legislature appoints a committee to communicate with the lobbyist and propose a bill, and determines whether the proposal is ...
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OtherEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · September 19, 2013
This paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences, through unrestricted deliberation, get aggregated into a group decision in two contexts: reciprocating gifts, and choosing between lotteries. In both contexts we find that median group memb ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · September 5, 2013
This paper shows that in online auctions like eBay, if bidders can only place bids at random times, then many di fferent equilibria arise besides truthful bidding, despite the option to leave proxy bids. These equilibria can involve gradual bidding, period ...
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Journal ArticleEconometrica · January 1, 2013
This comment corrects two results in the 2006 Econometrica paper by Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (AWA), that features a model in which individuals face a trade-off between flexibility and commitment. First, in contrast to Proposition 1 in AWA, we show th ...
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Journal ArticleAmerican Economic Review · December 1, 2012
This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential puni ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · October 9, 2012
Supplementary Appendix to Testing an Informational Theory of Legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives. ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · May 1, 2012
This paper studies a class of multi-self decision-making models proposed in economics, psychology, and marketing. In this class, choices arise from the set-dependent aggregation of a collection of utility functions, where the aggregation procedure satisfie ...
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OtherEconomic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) · March 1, 2012
Withdrawal penalties are common features of time deposit contracts offered by commercial banks, as well as individual retirement accounts and employer-sponsored plans. Moreover, there is a significant amount of early withdrawals from these accounts, despit ...
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Journal ArticleQuarterly Journal of Economics · August 1, 2010
We explain trends in dowry levels in Bangladesh by drawing attention to an institutional feature of marriage contracts previously ignored in the literature: mehr or traditional Islamic bride-price. We develop a model of marriage contracts in which mehr ser ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Economic Theory · March 1, 2009
This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to ...
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Journal ArticleAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics · February 1, 2009
This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in twosided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers ge ...
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Journal ArticleTheoretical Economics · December 1, 2008
Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-l ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Political Economy · October 1, 2008
Using data from rural Bangladesh, we explore the hypothesis that women attain less schooling as a result of social and financial pressure to marry young. We isolate the causal effect of marriage timing using age of menarche as an instrumental variable. Our ...
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Journal ArticleTheoretical Economics · March 1, 2008
This paper analyzes multi-sender cheap talk when the state space might be restricted, either because the policy space is restricted or the set of rationalizable policies of the receiver is not the whole space. We provide a necessary and sufficient conditio ...
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Journal ArticleQuarterly Journal of Economics · August 7, 2006
This paper investigates how groups or coalitions of players can act in their collective interest in noncooperative normal form games even if equilibrium play is not assumed. The main idea is that each member of a coalition will confine play to a subset of ...
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