Overview
Bahar Leventoglu is a formal theorist with substantive interests in international relations and political economy. Currently, she has four different ongoing lines of research. One line of research focuses on how leaders use public statements to affect their bargaining position in international negotiations. A second line of research deals with rational explanations of war. A third line of research concerns habit formation in bargaining situations as well as use of strategic tools, e.g. sanctions, in bargaining. A fourth line of research concerns regime transitions: One project focuses on the effect of social mobility on regime transitions, where as another one examines how coalition formation among groups that are ethnically as well as economically divided have an impact on democratization.
Current Appointments & Affiliations
Associate Professor of Political Science
·
2013 - Present
Political Science,
Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
Associate Professor of Economics
·
2013 - Present
Economics,
Trinity College of Arts & Sciences
Recent Publications
Federalism, political imbalance, and the right to secession
Journal Article Constitutional Political Economy · January 1, 2025 Scholars have generally taken a negative view of the inclusion of secession rights in federal constitutions. Adopting a constitutional political economy perspective, we challenge this consensus by highlighting the critical role that the right to secession ... Full text CiteSynthesizing Theories of Authoritarian Elections: A Game-Free Analysis
Journal Article Comparative Political Studies · January 1, 2024 Authoritarian regimes adopt ostensibly democratic institutions for undemocratic purposes. Existing research emphasizes five different functions of elections under authoritarianism, driven by idiosyncratic assumptions about the type of dictator and the stru ... Full text CiteBargaining power in crisis bargaining
Journal Article Review of Economic Design · December 1, 2023 A large body of game-theoretic work examines the process by which uncertainty can lead to inefficient war. In a typical crisis bargaining model, players negotiate according to a pre-specified game form and no player has the ability to change the rules of t ... Full text CiteRecent Grants
Collaborative Research: Public Commitment in International Relations
ResearchPrincipal Investigator · Awarded by National Science Foundation · 2007 - 2008View All Grants
Education, Training & Certifications
University of Rochester ·
2001
Ph.D.
University of Rochester ·
1999
M.A.
Bilkent University (Turkey) ·
1994
B.S.