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Bahar Leventoglu

Associate Professor of Political Science
Political Science
Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708-0204
140 Science Drive, 208 Gross Hall, Durham, NC 27708

Selected Publications

Bargaining power in crisis bargaining

Journal Article Review of Economic Design · December 1, 2023 A large body of game-theoretic work examines the process by which uncertainty can lead to inefficient war. In a typical crisis bargaining model, players negotiate according to a pre-specified game form and no player has the ability to change the rules of t ... Full text Cite

Born Weak, Growing Strong: Anti-Government Protests as a Signal of Rebel Strength in the Context of Civil Wars

Journal Article American Journal of Political Science · July 1, 2018 All rebel organizations start weak, but how do they grow and achieve favorable conflict outcomes? We present a theoretical model that allows for rebel organizations to gain support beyond their “core” and build their bargaining power during fighting. We hi ... Full text Cite

Bargaining with habit formation

Journal Article Economic Theory · October 1, 2017 Habit formation is a well-documented behavioral regularity in psychology and economics; however, its implications on bargaining outcomes have so far been overlooked. I study an otherwise standard Rubinstein bargaining model with habit-forming players. In e ... Full text Cite

Limited Audience Costs in International Crises

Journal Article Journal of Conflict Resolution · 2012 Cite

Social Mobility, Middle Class and Political Transitions

Journal Article Journal of Conflict Resolution · 2012 Cite

Minorities and Democratization

Journal Article Economics and Politics · 2012 Cite

Public commitment in crisis bargaining

Journal Article International Studies Quarterly · September 1, 2009 The "audience cost" literature argues that highly-resolved leaders can use public threats to credibly signal their resolve in incomplete-information crisis bargaining, thereby overcoming informational asymmetries that lead to war. If democracies are better ... Full text Cite

Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining?*

Journal Article International Studies Quarterly · September 2008 Full text Cite

The armed peace: A punctuated equilibrium theory of war

Journal Article American Journal of Political Science · October 1, 2007 According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power causes a credible commitment problem. This mechanism does not specify how inefficient fighting can resolve this cause, so it is an incomplete explanation o ... Full text Cite

Social mobility and political transitions

Journal Article Journal of Theoretical Politics · October 1, 2005 I address the role of social mobility in political transitions. I develop a political economy model of regime transitions that incorporates social mobility as a key feature of the economy capturing the political attitudes toward redistribution. I show that ... Full text Cite

Prenegotiation public commitment in domestic and international bargaining

Journal Article American Political Science Review · August 1, 2005 We use a formal bargaining model to examine why, in many domestic and international bargaining situations, one or both negotiators make public statements in front of their constituents committing themselves to obtaining certain benefits in the negotiations ... Full text Open Access Cite