
Bargaining with habit formation
Publication
, Journal Article
Leventoğlu, B
Published in: Economic Theory
October 1, 2017
Habit formation is a well-documented behavioral regularity in psychology and economics; however, its implications on bargaining outcomes have so far been overlooked. I study an otherwise standard Rubinstein bargaining model with habit-forming players. In equilibrium, a player can strategically exploit his opponent’s habit- forming behavior via unilateral transfers off the equilibrium path to generate endogenous costs and gain bargaining leverage at no cost to himself on the equilibrium path. Uncertainty about habit formation may lead to delay in agreement.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1432-0479
ISSN
0938-2259
Publication Date
October 1, 2017
Volume
64
Issue
3
Start / End Page
477 / 508
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 1403 Econometrics
- 1402 Applied Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Leventoğlu, B. (2017). Bargaining with habit formation. Economic Theory, 64(3), 477–508. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0994-z
Leventoğlu, B. “Bargaining with habit formation.” Economic Theory 64, no. 3 (October 1, 2017): 477–508. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0994-z.
Leventoğlu B. Bargaining with habit formation. Economic Theory. 2017 Oct 1;64(3):477–508.
Leventoğlu, B. “Bargaining with habit formation.” Economic Theory, vol. 64, no. 3, Oct. 2017, pp. 477–508. Scopus, doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0994-z.
Leventoğlu B. Bargaining with habit formation. Economic Theory. 2017 Oct 1;64(3):477–508.

Published In
Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1432-0479
ISSN
0938-2259
Publication Date
October 1, 2017
Volume
64
Issue
3
Start / End Page
477 / 508
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 1403 Econometrics
- 1402 Applied Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory