Scholars@Duke
James J. Anton

James J. Anton

Wesley J. Magat Distinguished Professor of Business Administration
Fuqua School of Business
james.anton@duke.edu
Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708-0120
Fuqua Sch of Bus, Durham, NC 27708

Selected Publications

Quality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market

Journal Article Journal of Economic Theory · May 1, 2013 We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth for a durable goods monopoly. The seller may offer any bundle(s) of current and previous quality improvements (upgrades). Subgame perfect equilibrium seller payoffs range from capturing the full social ... Full text Cite

Delay as Agenda Setting

Journal Article Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper · June 5, 2012 We examine a multi-issue dynamic decision-making process that involves endogenous commitment. Our primary focus is on actions that impact delay, an extreme form of lack of commitment. Delay is strategically interesting when decision makers with asymmetric ... Open Access Cite

Inventory in vertical relationships with private information and interdependent values

Journal Article International Journal of Economic Theory · March 1, 2011 We study the use of inventory when a distributor is better informed about demand than a manufacturer. We find that when distributor and manufacturer values are interdependent it is optimal to endow the distributor with some inventory before it obtains its ... Full text Cite

Compatibility, interoperability, and market power in upgrade markets

Journal Article Economics of Innovation and New Technology · June 1, 2010 We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions of a product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across versions. In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also c ... Full text Cite

Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data

Journal Article Games and Economic Behavior · May 1, 2010 In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient ... Full text Cite

Attracting skeptical buyers: Negotiating for intellectual property rights

Journal Article International Economic Review · February 1, 2008 Expropriable disclosures of knowledge to prospective buyers may be necessary to facilitate the sale of intellectual property (IP). In principle, confidentiality agreements can protect disclosures by granting the seller rights to sue for unauthorized use. I ... Full text Cite

Finding "lost" profits: An equilibrium analysis of patent infringement damages

Journal Article Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · April 1, 2007 We examine the impact of patent infringement damages in an equilibrium oligopoly model of process innovation where the choice to infringe is endogenous and affects market choices. Under the lost profits measure of damages normally employed by U.S. courts, ... Full text Cite

Policy implications of weak patent rights

Conference Innovation Policy and the Economy 6 · January 1, 2006 Link to item Cite

Storability, market structure, and demand-shift incentives

Journal Article RAND Journal of Economics · September 1, 2005 We consider a two-period model in which buyers can store a good by purchasing in advance of consumption so as to realize potential gains from intertemporal arbitrage. We find that storability introduces a kink in the aggregate period-1 demand. When supply ... Cite

Markets for partially contractible knowledge: Bootstrapping versus bundling

Journal Article Journal of the European Economic Association · January 1, 2005 We discuss how a seller can appropriate rents when selling knowledge that lacks legal property rights by solving either an expropriation or a valuation problem and then analyze how seller rents increase when a portion of the intellectual property (IP) can ... Full text Cite

Regulation, local monopolies and spatial competition

Journal Article Journal of Regulatory Economics · March 1, 2004 Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market seg ... Full text Cite

Little patents and big secrets: Managing intellectual property

Journal Article RAND Journal of Economics · January 1, 2004 Exploitation of an innovation commonly requires some disclosure of enabling knowledge {e.g., to obtain a patent or induce complementary investment). When property rights offer only limited protection, the value of the disclosure is offset by the increased ... Full text Cite

Patents, invalidity, and the strategic transmission of enabling information

Journal Article Journal of Economics and Management Strategy · June 1, 2003 The patent system encourages innovation and knowledge disclosure by providing exclusivity to inventors. Exclusivity is limited, however, because a substantial fraction of patents have some probability of being ruled invalid when challenged in court. The po ... Full text Cite

Entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross-market price constraints

Journal Article International Journal of Industrial Organization · January 1, 2002 We examine how universal service provisions and price restrictions across markets impact strategic entry and pricing. We develop a simple multi-market model with an oligopolistic (profitable) urban market and entry auctions for (unprofitable) rural service ... Full text Cite

The sale of ideas: Strategic disclosure, property rights, and contracting

Journal Article Review of Economic Studies · January 1, 2002 Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions ... Full text Cite

Start-ups, spin-offs, and internal projects

Journal Article Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · October 1, 1995 Cite

Seniority and Efficiency

Journal Article The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · September 1992 Full text Cite

Coordination in split award auctions

Journal Article Quarterly Journal of Economics · January 1, 1992 We analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilib ... Full text Cite

Measuring the effectiveness of competition in defense procurement: A survey of the empirical literature

Journal Article Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · January 1, 1990 This article surveys the empirical literature that has attempted to measure the effects of competition in defense procurement. Its focus is on the conceptual underpinnings of the empirical models rather than on the technical aspects of the estimation proce ... Full text Cite

Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation

Journal Article The RAND Journal of Economics · 1989 Full text Cite

External markets and regulation

Journal Article Journal of Public Economics · January 1, 1988 Regulated firms often sell to 'external' markets in addition to their regulated or 'internal' markets. The welfare of consumers in these 'external' markets is typically outside of the regulator's domain of concern. As a result, 'external' markets provide t ... Full text Cite

Second sourcing and the experience curve: Price competition in defense procurement

Journal Article RAND Journal of Economics · January 1, 1987 We examine a dynamic model of price competition in defense procurement that incorporates the experience curve, asymmetric cost information, and the availability of a higher cost alternative system. We model acquisition as a two-stage process in which initi ... Full text Cite