Book · January 1, 2025
This unique book offers a new approach to the modeling of rational decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and strategic and competition interactions among agents. It presents a unified theory in which the most basic axiom of rationality is the pri ...
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Chapter · November 1, 2017
In the academic literature and professional practice, there are a number of alternative and apparently competing methods for valuing risky projects. In this paper, we compare and contrast three different approaches: risk-adjusted discount-rate analysis, op ...
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Journal ArticleTheory and Decision · February 1, 2015
Game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash and Bayesian equilibrium start from an assumption that the players’ sets of possible payoffs, measured in units of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility, are common knowledge, and they go on to define rational behavi ...
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Journal ArticleIsipta 2011 Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability Theories and Applications · December 1, 2011
Game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium are commonly used to model strategic behavior in terms of precise probability distributions over outcomes. However, there are many potential sources of imprecision in beliefs about the outcome of a ...
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Journal ArticleEconomic Theory · October 1, 2011
The state-preference framework for modeling choice under uncertainty, in which objects of choice are allocations of wealth or commodities across states of the world, is a natural one for modeling "smooth" ambiguity-averse preferences. It does not require r ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Risk and Uncertainty · August 1, 2011
This paper presents a natural extension of Bayesian decision theory from the domain of individual decisions to the domain of group decisions. We assume that each group member accepts the assumptions of subjective expected utility theory with respect to the ...
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ConferenceIsipta 2009 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability Theories and Applications · December 1, 2009
In this paper we model the problem faced by a riskaverse decision maker with a precise subjective probability distribution who bets against a risk-neutral opponent or invests in a financial market where the beliefs of the opponent or the representative age ...
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Journal ArticleManagement Science · April 1, 2009
Scoring rules can provide incentives for truthful reporting of probabilities and evaluation measures for the probabilities after the events of interest are observed. Often the space of events is ordered and an evaluation relative to some baseline distribut ...
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Journal ArticleOperations Research · September 1, 2008
Information measures arise in many disciplines, including forecasting (where scoring rules are used to provide incentives for probability estimation), signal processing (where information gain is measured in physical units of relative entropy), decision an ...
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Journal ArticleIsipta 2007 Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability Theories and Applications · December 1, 2007
Suppose that a risk-averse expected utility maximizer with a precise probability distribution p bets opti- mally against a risk neutral opponent (or equiva- lently invests in an incomplete market for contingent claims) whose beliefs (or prices) are describ ...
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Journal ArticleAnnals of Statistics · October 1, 2006
Incomplete preferences provide the epistemic foundation for models of imprecise subjective probabilities and utilities that are used in robust Bayesian analysis and in theories of bounded rationality. This paper presents a simple axiomatization of incomple ...
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Journal ArticleManagement Science · January 1, 2006
Subjective expected utility theory does not distinguish between attitudes toward uncertainty (ambiguous probabilities) and attitudes toward risk (unambiguous probabilities). Both are explained in terms of nonlinear utility for money rather than properties ...
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Conference4th International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and their Applications Isipta 2005 · January 1, 2005
A generalization of subjective expected utility is presented in which the primitives are a finite set of states of the world, a finite set of strategies available to the decision maker, and allocations of money. The model does not require explicit definiti ...
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Journal ArticleInternational Journal of Game Theory · January 1, 2004
It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all ...
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Journal ArticleManagement Science · January 1, 2003
The Pratt-Arrow measure of local risk aversion is generalized for the n-dimensional state-preference model of choice under uncertainty in which the decision maker may have inseparable subjective probabilities and utilities, unobservable stochastic prior we ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Statistical Planning and Inference · June 15, 2002
Two methods are presented for the aggregation of imprecise probabilities elicited from a group of experts in terms of betting rates. In the first method, the experts bet with a common opponent subject to limits on their personal betting stakes, and their i ...
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Journal ArticleTheory and Decision · December 1, 2001
De Finetti's treatise on the theory of probability begins with the provocative statement PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST, meaning that probability does not exist in an objective sense. Rather, probability exists only subjectively within the minds of individuals ...
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Book · May 31, 1997
Audience: This work will be of interest to economists, management scientists, risk and policy analysts, and others who study risky decision-making in economic and environmental contexts. ...
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Journal ArticleTheory and Decision · November 1, 1995
The agreeing-to-disagree theorem of Aumann and the no-expected-gain-from-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey are reformulated under an operational definition of Bayesian rationality. Common knowledge of beliefs and preferences is achieved through transacti ...
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Journal ArticleManagement Science · May 1995
In the academic literature and professional practice, there are a number of alternative and apparently competing methods for valuing risky projects. In this paper, we compare and contrast three different approaches: risk-adjusted discount-rate ana ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Risk and Uncertainty · January 1, 1995
This article explores the extent to which a decision maker's probabilities can be measured separately from his/her utilities by observing his/her acceptance of small monetary gambles. Only a partial separation is achieved: the acceptable gambles are partit ...
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Journal ArticleManagement Science · March 1992
Decisions are often made under conditions of uncertainty about the actions of supposedly-rational competitors. The modeling of optimal behavior under such conditions is the subject of noncooperative game theory, of which a cornerstone is Harsanyi' ...
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Journal ArticleTheory and Decision · September 1, 1991
No-arbitrage is the fundamental principle of economic rationality which unifies normative decision theory, game theory, and market theory. In economic environments where money is available as a medium of measurement and exchange, no-arbitrage is synonymous ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of Economic Theory · January 1, 1990
A new concept of mutually expected rationality in noncooperative games is proposed: joint coherence. This is an extension of the "no arbitrage opportunities" axiom that underlies subjective probability theory and a variety of economic models. It sheds ligh ...
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Journal ArticleAnnals of Operations Research · December 1, 1989
This paper presents a new method of modeling indeterminate and incoherent probability judgments in decision analysis problems. The decision maker's degree of beliefs in the occurrence of an event is represented by a unimodal (in fact, concave) function on ...
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Journal ArticleManagement Science · October 1987
The issue of equivalence between chance-constrained programming problems (CCPP's) and Bayesian utility-maximization problems (BUMP's), and the anomalous evaluation of information in CCPP's, are re-examined in light of a recent paper by Jagannathan ...
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Journal ArticleManagement Science · May 1985
A scoring rule is a reward function for eliciting or evaluating forecasts expressed as discrete or continuous probability distributions. A rule is strictly proper if it encourages the forecaster to state his true subjective probabilities, and effe ...
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Journal ArticleEarthquake Engineering Structural Dynamics · January 1, 1982
This paper outlines the use of discrete, autoregressive/moving‐average (ARMA) models for identification and estimation of parameters in models derived from analysis of uniformly digitized earthquake ground motion acceleration data. Such models are of equal ...
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Journal Article · December 1, 1980
This report describes models used to simulate earthquake accelerograms and analyses of these artifical accelerogram records for use in structural response studies. The artifical accelerogram records are generated by a class of linear difference equations w ...
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Journal ArticleJournal of the Operational Research Society · January 1, 1979
This paper shows that the adaptive filtering and forecasting techniques proposed by Makridakis and Wheelwright can be viewed as approximations to a more precise filtering method in which the Kalman filter is applied to a dynamic autoregressive model which ...
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