Attacks on Perception-Based Control Systems: Modeling and Fundamental Limits

We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we consider a general setup with a nonlinear affine physical plant controlled with a perception-based controller that maps both the physical [e.g., inertial measurement units (IMUs)] and perceptual (e.g., camera) sensing to the control input; the system is also equipped with a statistical or learning-based anomaly detector (AD). We model the attacks in the most general form and introduce the notions of attack effectiveness and stealthiness independent of the used AD. In such a setting, we consider attacks with different levels of runtime knowledge about the plant. We find sufficient conditions for the existence of stealthy effective attacks that force the plant into an unsafe region without being detected by any AD. We show that as the open-loop unstable plant dynamics diverges faster and the closed-loop system converges faster to an equilibrium point, the system is more vulnerable to effective stealthy attacks. Also, depending on runtime information available to the attacker, the probability of the attack remaining stealthy can be arbitrarily close to one if the attacker's estimate of the plant's state is arbitrarily close to the true state; when an accurate estimate of the plant state is not available, the stealthiness level depends on the control performance in attack-free operation.

Duke Scholars

Author Henry Pfister Electrical and Computer Engineering

Author Miroslav Pajic Electrical and Computer Engineering