The Ethics of Combatting Pernicious Ideological Beliefs

Some ideological beliefs are harmful, both to those whose beliefs they are, and to others, insofar as those beliefs motivate harmful behavior toward others. Ideological beliefs are often recalcitrant to correction, because ideologies typically include belief-management processes that insulate beliefs from corrective measures. Consequently, rational argumentation and the presentation of evidence may not suffice to expunge pernicious ideological beliefs and nonconsensual, coercive means may be required for correction. In this article, I argue that nonconsensual, coercive interventions to correct pernicious ideological beliefs are justifiable in principle, even if they are undertaken on paternalistic rather than other-regarding grounds. I show that some of the effects of ideologies, including the disabling of ‘theory of mind’ – the ability to make reliable inferences about other persons' intentions and beliefs on the basis of their behavior – are closely analogous to serious mental illness. Accordingly, I argue in favor of ‘remedial soft paternalism’: interventions to restore a person's competence when they have become incompetent due to impairments of normal cognitive abilities.

Duke Scholars

Author Allen Edward Buchanan Philosophy