Mental control and effort differ across different kinds of mental action.

Rational decision-making often depends on coordinating sequences of mental actions, each with a distinctive phenomenology. Feelings of effort and fluency are central to many theoretical accounts of cognitive control. In the present study (N = 308), we examined how different mental actions-focusing, inhibiting, deciding, visualizing, visualizing alternatives, seeing, believing, and remembering-and their associated phenomenology relate to one another and to varying levels of control. Self-reported mental effort was positively associated with self-reported mental control, with this relationship stronger under higher than lower cognitive-load conditions. Effort was also positively related to control across all eight mental actions, with no clear division between more passive and more active forms. By contrast, the way effort and control combined to produce feelings of successful performance depended on the type of mental action, reflecting a passive-active distinction. This suggests that control and effort have a nuanced relationship to each other and with eliciting targeted mental actions.

Duke Scholars

Author Felipe De Brigard Philosophy