Delegating management to experts
Publication
, Journal Article
Dai, C; Lewis, TR; Lopomo, G
Published in: RAND Journal of Economics
January 1, 2006
Owners of property and assets frequently delegate decisions about operating and maintaining their property to managers who are better informed about local market conditions. We analyze how owners optimally contract with managers who vary in their expertise at prescribing service. We show that the most expert managers offer the greatest variation in operating recommendations. Owners benefit from dealing with experts provided they contract sequentially, whereby terms are negotiated gradually as the manager acquires information. Copyright © 2006, RAND.
Duke Scholars
Published In
RAND Journal of Economics
DOI
ISSN
0741-6261
Publication Date
January 1, 2006
Volume
37
Issue
3
Start / End Page
503 / 520
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3802 Econometrics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 14 Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Dai, C., Lewis, T. R., & Lopomo, G. (2006). Delegating management to experts. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 503–520. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00028.x
Dai, C., T. R. Lewis, and G. Lopomo. “Delegating management to experts.” RAND Journal of Economics 37, no. 3 (January 1, 2006): 503–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00028.x.
Dai C, Lewis TR, Lopomo G. Delegating management to experts. RAND Journal of Economics. 2006 Jan 1;37(3):503–20.
Dai, C., et al. “Delegating management to experts.” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37, no. 3, Jan. 2006, pp. 503–20. Scopus, doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00028.x.
Dai C, Lewis TR, Lopomo G. Delegating management to experts. RAND Journal of Economics. 2006 Jan 1;37(3):503–520.
Published In
RAND Journal of Economics
DOI
ISSN
0741-6261
Publication Date
January 1, 2006
Volume
37
Issue
3
Start / End Page
503 / 520
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3802 Econometrics
- 3801 Applied economics
- 14 Economics