Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction
Publication
, Journal Article
McAdams, D
Published in: Economics Letters
January 1, 2012
Suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Economics Letters
DOI
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication Date
January 1, 2012
Volume
114
Issue
1
Start / End Page
83 / 85
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 14 Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
McAdams, D. (2012). Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction. Economics Letters, 114(1), 83–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036
McAdams, D. “Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction.” Economics Letters 114, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 83–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036.
McAdams D. Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction. Economics Letters. 2012 Jan 1;114(1):83–5.
McAdams, D. “Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction.” Economics Letters, vol. 114, no. 1, Jan. 2012, pp. 83–85. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036.
McAdams D. Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction. Economics Letters. 2012 Jan 1;114(1):83–85.
Published In
Economics Letters
DOI
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication Date
January 1, 2012
Volume
114
Issue
1
Start / End Page
83 / 85
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 14 Economics