Who pays when auction rules are bent?
Publication
, Journal Article
McAdams, D; Schwarz, M
Published in: International Journal of Industrial Organization
October 1, 2007
In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mechanism in which no one has the ability or the incentive to break the rules. Examples of "costly rule bending" considered here include hiring shill bidders and trying to learn others' bids before making one's own. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Duke Scholars
Published In
International Journal of Industrial Organization
DOI
ISSN
0167-7187
Publication Date
October 1, 2007
Volume
25
Issue
5
Start / End Page
1144 / 1157
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 1403 Econometrics
- 1402 Applied Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
McAdams, D., & Schwarz, M. (2007). Who pays when auction rules are bent? International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25(5), 1144–1157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004
McAdams, D., and M. Schwarz. “Who pays when auction rules are bent?” International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, no. 5 (October 1, 2007): 1144–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004.
McAdams D, Schwarz M. Who pays when auction rules are bent? International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2007 Oct 1;25(5):1144–57.
McAdams, D., and M. Schwarz. “Who pays when auction rules are bent?” International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 25, no. 5, Oct. 2007, pp. 1144–57. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004.
McAdams D, Schwarz M. Who pays when auction rules are bent? International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2007 Oct 1;25(5):1144–1157.
Published In
International Journal of Industrial Organization
DOI
ISSN
0167-7187
Publication Date
October 1, 2007
Volume
25
Issue
5
Start / End Page
1144 / 1157
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 1403 Econometrics
- 1402 Applied Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory