On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions
Publication
, Journal Article
McAdams, D
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory
November 1, 2007
Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1095-7235
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
November 1, 2007
Volume
137
Issue
1
Start / End Page
729 / 732
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
McAdams, D. (2007). On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 729–732. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002
McAdams, D. “On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory 137, no. 1 (November 1, 2007): 729–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002.
McAdams D. On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 Nov 1;137(1):729–32.
McAdams, D. “On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 137, no. 1, Nov. 2007, pp. 729–32. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002.
McAdams D. On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 Nov 1;137(1):729–732.
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1095-7235
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
November 1, 2007
Volume
137
Issue
1
Start / End Page
729 / 732
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory