Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
Publication
, Journal Article
McAdams, D
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory
September 1, 2007
The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1095-7235
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
September 1, 2007
Volume
136
Issue
1
Start / End Page
144 / 166
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
McAdams, D. (2007). Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 144–166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002
McAdams, D. “Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation.” Journal of Economic Theory 136, no. 1 (September 1, 2007): 144–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002.
McAdams D. Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 Sep 1;136(1):144–66.
McAdams, D. “Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation.” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 136, no. 1, Sept. 2007, pp. 144–66. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002.
McAdams D. Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 Sep 1;136(1):144–166.
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
EISSN
1095-7235
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
September 1, 2007
Volume
136
Issue
1
Start / End Page
144 / 166
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory