Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool
Publication
, Journal Article
McAdams, D
Published in: Economics Letters
April 1, 2007
In some uniform-price auctions, the auctioneer decides how much to sell after the bidding. Auctioneer expected profit and social welfare can each be strictly higher in all equilibria given such "adjustable supply" than in all equilibria given any fixed quantity and reserve price. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Economics Letters
DOI
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication Date
April 1, 2007
Volume
95
Issue
1
Start / End Page
48 / 53
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 14 Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
McAdams, D. (2007). Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool. Economics Letters, 95(1), 48–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035
McAdams, D. “Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool.” Economics Letters 95, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 48–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035.
McAdams D. Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool. Economics Letters. 2007 Apr 1;95(1):48–53.
McAdams, D. “Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool.” Economics Letters, vol. 95, no. 1, Apr. 2007, pp. 48–53. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035.
McAdams D. Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool. Economics Letters. 2007 Apr 1;95(1):48–53.
Published In
Economics Letters
DOI
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication Date
April 1, 2007
Volume
95
Issue
1
Start / End Page
48 / 53
Related Subject Headings
- Economics
- 38 Economics
- 14 Economics