Yingni Guo

Journal Article Journal of Economic Theory · March 1, 2025 A seller of an indivisible good designs a selling mechanism for a buyer whose private information (his type) is the distribution of his value for the good. A selling mechanism includes both a menu of sequential pricing, and a menu of information disclosure ... Full text Open Access Cite

Robust Monopoly Regulation

Journal Article American Economic Review · February 1, 2025 Featured Publication We study how to regulate a monopolistic firm using a robust-design, non-Bayesian approach. We derive a policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his reali ... Full text Open Access Cite

Regret-Minimizing Project Choice

Journal Article Econometrica · September 1, 2023 Featured Publication An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We solve for a mechanism that minimizes the principal's worst-case regret. We compare the single-pro ... Full text Open Access Cite

Information transmission and voting

Journal Article Economic Theory · October 1, 2021 I analyze an individual’s incentive to disclose hard evidence in the context of committee voting. A committee consists of three members: one left-leaning, one right-leaning, and the third ex ante unbiased. They decide on whether to pursue a left or right p ... Full text Open Access Cite

Costly miscalibration

Journal Article Theoretical Economics · May 1, 2021 We consider a platform that provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium ... Full text Open Access Cite

The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments

Journal Article Quarterly Journal of Economics · February 1, 2021 Featured Publication Communication facilitates cooperation by ensuring that deviators are collectively punished. We explore how players might misuse communication to threaten one another, and we identify ways that organizations can deter misuse and restore cooperation. In our ... Full text Open Access Cite

The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure

Journal Article Econometrica · March 1, 2019 Featured Publication A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information about a payoff-relevant quality. The receiver has private information about the quality, referred to as his type. We show that the sender-optimal mechanism takes the form of nested ... Full text Open Access Cite

Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Journal Article Theoretical Economics · September 1, 2018 A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasi ... Full text Open Access Cite

Dynamic delegation of experimentation

Journal Article American Economic Review · August 1, 2016 Featured Publication I study a dynamic relationship where a principal delegates experimentation to an agent. Experimentation is modeled as a one-armed bandit that yields successes following a Poisson process. Its unknown intensity is high or low. The agent has private informat ... Full text Open Access Cite

Wealth dynamics in communities

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